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CHOICES FOR A CHILD: AN ETHICAL AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF A FAILED SURROGATE BIRTH CONTRACT
And the king said, Divide the living child in two, and give
half to one and half to the other.'
This was King Solomon's advice to two women fighting over a
child each contended was her own. The true mother was the
one who was willing to give the baby to the imposter rather
than see her child divided.
In today's world of increasingly sophisticated reproductive
technologies which offer once infertile couples the chance to
have their own child, one wonders what wisdom King Solomon
would provide in a conflict involving a woman hired to bear
another couple's child. This paper explores such a situation.
In our scenario, the husband and wife who hire the surrogate
mother are both fertile, but because of her diabetes, the wife
does not wish to endure the risks of pregnancy. They employ a
second woman to carry the wife's egg, which is fertilized by the
husband's sperm. The surrogate mother carries the baby to
term. However, the baby is born with defects, and a conflict
arises between the surrogate mother and the couple as to how
much medical treatment the baby should receive.2 Part I of
this paper will explore the medical complications of the couple,
the terms of the surrogate contract, the procedure of in vitro
fertilization involved, and the outlook for the child. The second
part will discuss the ethical ramifications of the available choic-
es and determine which choice is the "correct" choice, focusing
on the question of who should decide for the infant. The third
1. 1 Kings 3:25.
2. The medical portion of this problem is taken largely from the "Baby Doe"
case which occurred in Bloomington, Indiana in 1982. For a very descriptive account
of the story, see JEFF LYON, PLAYING GOD IN THE NURSERY (1985). The surrogacy
arrangement is an added wrinkle designed to add another layer to the ethical and
legal analyses.
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part will determine how the law would handle this complex
problem. Finally, the fourth part will explore whether the "ethi-
cal" or the "legal" answer is better.
I. THE PROBLEM
A. The Parents
Joe and Melissa have been married for ten years and have
no children. They are both professionals, and they maintain a
comfortable standard of living. They have chosen to avoid preg-
nancy for many reasons, including their desire to become pro-
fessionally and financially established. However, the primary
reason for delaying children has been Melissa's diabetes.
Diagnosed with type I diabetes3 at the age of fifteen, Melissa
is aware of the risks a diabetic pregnancy brings. Diabetic
women have greater chances for complications during pregnancy
than women without diabetes, including an increased risk of
"adverse birth outcomes."4 In the general population, approxi-
mately 250,000 children each year are born with birth defects
in the United States.5 One in thirty-five children born in this
country will be diagnosed as mentally retarded or as having
some form of "significant neurological handicap."6 While great
strides have been made in ensuring healthy and successful
pregnancies to both diabetic mothers and their children,
"[c]ongenital malformations still account for nearly fifty percent
of the deaths among infants born to diabetic mothers today."7
The most serious defects are "three to four times more likely to
occur among infants of diabetic women than among infants of
3. Type I diabetes results from decreased production of insulin, the hormone pro-
duced by the pancreas which processes glucose in the blood. LEO P. KRALL & RICH-
ARD S. BEASER, JOSLIN DIABETES MANUAL 2, 15 (12th ed. 1989). People who suffer
from type I diabetes must take insulin injections for the rest of their lives. Id. at 15.
This is in contrast to type II diabetes, wherein the body produces some insulin, but
not enough to supply the body's needs. Id.
4. Pregnancy Complications and Perinatal Outcomes Among Women With Diabe-
tes-North Carolina, 1989-1990, 270 JAMA 2424, 2424 (1993).
5. MORTON WALKER ET AL., THE COMPLETE BOOK OF BIRTH 45 (1979).
6. Id. at 28.
7. Richard M. Scheffier et al., Prevention: The Cost-Effectiveness of the California
Diabetes and Pregnancy Program, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 168, 168 (1992).
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non-diabetics, and affect six percent to nine percent of all dia-
betic pregnancies."8 These defects affect a variety of the baby's
organs, but "those affecting the heart and skeletal systems are
the most frequent."' Nevertheless, with proper care the fre-
quency of birth anomalies are not much more frequent for dia-
betic women than for the general population.'0 After carefully
weighing these facts, Joe and Melissa decided to avoid preg-
nancy and birth.
However, though they gained some comfort in their lives,
they longed for the chance to share themselves with a child.
Still very wary about the risks to both Melissa and their child
should Melissa become pregnant, and after much thought, they
decided to find someone who would carry their child for them.
B. The Surrogate Mother
Women have been serving as surrogate birth mothers for
centuries." However, it was around 1976 that contract surro-
gacy emerged, and by 1986 about 500 children had been born
as a result of such arrangements.' Under a typical surrogate
motherhood contract, the surrogate mother signs an agreement
under which she consents to become pregnant for the contract-
ing couple, gives birth to the baby, and thereafter terminates
any and all parental rights she (and her husband, if there is
one) may have regarding the child. The contracting couple
agrees to pay the medical expenses of the pregnancy and deliv-
ery and perhaps even the surrogate mother's living expenses
during this time, in addition to a substantial fee." Generally,
this latter fee is about $10,000.'4
8. Id.
9. KRALL & BEASER, supra note 3, at 219.
10. Id. In addition, the pregnant diabetic woman herself is more likely to suffer
from urinary tract infections, preeclampsia (characterized by elevated blood pressure,
protein in the urine, and fluid retention), polyhydramnios (the accumulation of an
excess amount of the amniotic fluid that normally surrounds the fetus), and stillbirth.
Id. at 232-33.
11. See Genesis 16:14,15; 30:1-10 (when Sarah, Rachel, and Leah were infertile,
they gave their handmaids to have babies for their husbands).
12. MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 5 (1988).
13. See Katie M. Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a Child, 20 J.
FAM. L. 263 (1981) (containing a typical form contract for surrogate motherhood).
14. FIELD, supra note 12, at 5. Whether these contracts are enforceable, voidable,
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Joe and Melissa conducted a private search for a suitable
surrogate mother, and they decided that Lisa was the best
candidate. She is twenty-eight, married with two children, and
in good health. Lisa was interested because she knows how
much joy and fulfillment her children have brought to her and
thought it tragic that, for whatever reason, Joe and Melissa
were a childless couple. She was also pleased with the opportu-
nity to make $10,000. After extensive meetings and discussion,
they agreed on the terms, signed the contract, and planned for
a baby.
C. The In Vitro Fertilization Process
Because both Joe and Melissa have the biological ability to
create a child, they wanted their child to be the product of Joe's
sperm and Melissa's egg. In vitro fertilization is the procedure
they chose to guarantee the genetic connection. By this process,
eggs are harvested from the mother's ovaries and joined in a
petri dish with the father's fresh sperm. 5 This harvesting in-
volves cutting into the mother's abdomen, inserting a telescope
(called a laparoscope) into the abdominal cavity to allow for
inspection of the internal organs and collection of the eggs,
puncturing follicles of one of the ovaries, and drawing follicular
fluid containing one or more eggs through a needle inserted
next to the laparoscope. 6
After successful fertilization, the fertilized egg is transferred
to the surrogate mother. In this procedure, a catheter is filled
with the embryo and culture fluid from the petri dish, inserted
deep into the woman's uterus through the vagina, and emptied
into the surrogate mother's womb.' The rates of success of in
vitro fertilization are very low, and even the most successful
or void varies from state to state. See infra part III.
15. DIANA FRANK & MARTA VOGEL, THE BABY MAKERS 88-89 (1988).
16. John F. Leeton et al., IVF and ET: What it is and How it Works, in TEST
TUBE BABIES: A GUIDE TO MORAL QUESTIONS, PRESENT TECHNIQUES AND FUTURE
POSSIBILITIES 2, 5-6 (William A. W. Walters & Peter Singer eds., 1982). An alternate
method involves using ultrasound to locate ripe follicles so as to avoid both the gen-
eral anesthesia and the incision into the abdomen. After viewing the ultrasound pic-
tures on a television screen, the physician penetrates the vaginal wall with a needle
that draws up the egg. FRANK & VOGEL, supra note 15, at 90.
17. FRANK & VOGEL, supra note 15, at 89.
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programs only experience about a twenty percent chance of
success. 8 During the pre-fertilization counseling, Joe and Me-
lissa were prepared not only for failure but also for the possibil-
ity of complications. Luckily enough, the procedure was success-
ful. Lisa carried the baby for nine months, saw her doctor regu-
larly, and took excellent care of herself. All the while, she was
fully prepared to give the child to Joe and Melissa at birth and
spoke freely to others about the arrangement and her willing
and joyful participation.
D. The Baby is Born
When Lisa went into labor, Joe and Melissa rushed to the
hospital. It was an uncomplicated labor and birth, and all three
were elated when it was over. Their happiness, however, was
soon overcome by disappointment. Their baby boy was born
with the form of mental retardation commonly known as Down
syndrome. He also had an additional serious complication called
an esophageal atresia. This is a condition in which the esopha-
gus fails to develop normally and ends in a "blind pouch" before
connecting to the stomach, which prevents food from reaching
the stomach. 9 The esophageal obstruction could have been
corrected by surgery, but the baby would die if left alone.2"
Down syndrome, on the other hand, is something that the child
and the family would have to live with for the rest of the
child's life.
Down syndrome can be diagnosed by a chromosomal analysis,
but physical characteristics such as slanting eyes, white spots
on the iris of the eye, tongue protrusion, a flat bridge of the
nose, a short neck, and a gap between the first and second toes
often draw a doctor to an initial diagnosis of Down syn-
drome.2 In addition to the developmental disabilities of Down
syndrome children, there can be medical complications as
18. Id. at 82.
19. LYON, supra note 2, at 24.
20. Norman Fost, Putting Hospitals on Notice, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1982,
at 5, 5.
21. MARCI J. HANSON, TEACHING THE INFANT WITH DOWN SYNDROME 20 (2d ed.
1987).
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well." About half of newborn infants with Down syndrome
have jaundice. " Some have blood abnormalities and heart
problems that may or may not be detected in the newborn.'
These children also are very prone to ear infections that can
cause hearing problems as they grow older.25 There is also the
possibility of a dislocation of the first and second cervical verte-
brae in the upper neck which could cause future neurological
problems.26
Thinking, perhaps overly optimistically, that there would be
no problems, Joe and Melissa did not require Lisa to endure an
amniocentesis procedure during the pregnancy. This test could
have determined whether the baby was going to have any seri-
ous birth defects, including Down syndrome.27 Amniocentesis is
urged for women who have previously given birth to a child
with genetic birth defects, for women who come from families
or ethnic groups with a history of genetic birth defects, or for
women who have taken excessive drugs or alcohol or have been
exposed to X-rays or German Measles since becoming preg-
nant. 8 Mothers of Melissa's age have only between a one in
four hundred and a one in nine hundred chance of having a
child with Down syndrome," and neither Melissa nor Lisa fit
any of the three criteria for recommending amniocentesis. Fur-
thermore, the chance for infection, hemorrhage, and miscarriage
from the amniocentesis procedure itself is between one in two
hundred and one in five hundred. Finally, Lisa feared the dis-
comfort associated with the insertion of a hypodermic needle
into her abdomen and the removal of amniotic fluid from her
womb.3" For these reasons, they decided that the risks in-
volved with avoiding the procedure were slight. When the baby
came, they regretted this decision.
22. Id. at 21.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. RUTH W. LUBIC & GENE R. HAWES, CHILDBEARING: A BOOK OF CHOICES 20,
77 (1987).
28. Id. at 78.
29. Id. Since Down syndrome is caused by a genetic defect in the egg cell, I use
the odds for Melissa's age as egg provider rather than Lisa's age as womb provider.
30. Id. at 20, 78.
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Joe and Melissa were not sure they wanted to bring this
baby into their world. They questioned whether they had the
capacity to deal with the extra needs of a child with Down syn-
drome. They also did not want to subject their child to the
intolerance that they felt he surely would encounter. It would
be a different situation if Down syndrome were the only "de-
fect"; they would view ending the life of an otherwise healthy
Down syndrome child as murder and, therefore, not an option.
However, this child also has a detached esophagus requiring
serious surgery. While the surgery's chance of success is good,
it is not guaranteed to correct the problem. Since he would die
without the operation, merely withholding treatment from this
child seemed less "wrong," because it would end the child's
suffering.
Lisa, however, did not agree. Even though she was perfectly
willing to give the child to Joe and Melissa, she was not willing
to let them allow the child to waste away and eventually die.
She thought that, since the chances were good that the esopha-
gus could be repaired, the baby must be given a chance to
survive. Lisa was of the opinion that Down syndrome children
and adults, though challenged by their various handicaps, live
happy lives. She was determined that the child she carried for
nine months, though not the biological product of her DNA,
must be given the chance to live and thrive.
When Joe and Melissa expressed their desire to the physician
that he not perform the operation to repair the esophagus, Lisa
protested, and demanded that the operation be performed. The
remainder of this paper will attempt to determine how this
conflict should be resolved.
II. THE ETHICS OF CHOOSING
In exploring the ethical ramifications of this decision, we
must approach it with two different questions in mind. First,
who should decide whether to forego treatment? Second, what
should that person or those people decide?
2811996]
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A. Who Should Decide?
In an ideal situation, a patient himself will decide the course
of his treatment. Each of us is in control of his or her own
destiny, and we must be given the opportunity to make the
decisions which determine these destinies. This idea is reflected
in the principle of biomedical ethics commonly referred to as re-
spect for autonomy. Under this principle, we gain "personal rule
of the self by adequate understanding while remaining free
from controlling interferences by others and from personal limi-
tations that prevent choice."3 In this way, "[m]utual respect
and fostering of autonomy guarantees on equal terms to each
individual the opportunity to adopt, evaluate, and revise a point
of view on how to live his life." 2 This view is often recognized
as an important tenet of personal liberty under the law as
well.33
When dealing with a person who is not competent to make
the choice to proceed with or forego treatment, especially when
the patient is an infant who was never competent, the principle
of respect for autonomy is not very helpful to reaching a moral
decision.34 When an incompetent patient must make a decision
about medical treatment, a surrogate decisionmaker is required.
In the case of an infant, the parents are by far the best surro-
gate decisionmakers. s However, in this particular case, the
baby arguably has three parents: the mother who provided the
egg; her husband, the father, who provided the sperm; and the
surrogate who provided the womb.
31. Tom L. Beauchamp, Informed Consent, in MEDICAL ETHICS 173, 183 (Robert
M. Veatch ed., 1989).
32. Phoebe A. Haddon, Baby Doe Cases: Compromise and Moral Dilemma, 34
EMORY L.J. 545, 551 (1985).
33. See, e.g., Rains v. Belshe, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 185, 192 (Ct. App. 1995); State v.
Herbert, 568 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1990); In re Lawrence, 579 N.E.2d 32, 39 (Ind. 1991);
In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 454 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J., concurring).
34. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETH-
ics 127 (1994).
35. "It is now widely agreed that the patient's closest family member is the first
choice as surrogate." Id. at 244. When the patient is a newborn, "the parents general-
ly should be the primary decisionmakers." Id. at 245. Even though the idea of chil-
dren as property over which parents have complete domain has changed dramatically,
"parental autonomy has prevailed, protecting decisionmaking rights of parents in most
circumstances." Haddon, supra note 32, at 565-66.
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It is clear that Joe and Melissa have a right to make the
treatment decision as the baby's biological parents. The baby
was given life because of their actions. Melissa went through
the painful process of harvesting eggs from her ovaries. They
waited anxiously to see if fertilization would occur. The baby
has the combination of their genetic makeup.
However, Lisa's effort and connection to the situation cannot
be denied. She carried the baby for nine months. Like most
women, she grew very close to the fetus, this person, as it de-
veloped within her body.3" She arguably has the right to con-
tribute to the decision, in spite of the fact that the agreement
stipulated that she would forfeit all parental rights at birth. In
fact, she is still willing to do so. She just cannot live with the
thought that the child she bore will be allowed to die.
According to one proposed list of qualifications, a surrogate
decisionnaker for incompetent patients should possess:
1) The ability to make reasoned judgments (competence);
2) Adequate knowledge and information;
3) Emotional stability; and
4) A commitment to the incompetent patient's interests that
is free of conflicts of interest and free of controlling influence by
those who might not act in the patient's best interests."
Let's assume that both Lisa and Joe/Melissa can act in ac-
cord with the first three qualifications.38 Whether there is a
genuine conflict between the baby's interests and the biological
parents' interests will likely be the deciding factor. The judg-
ment of Joe and Melissa may be clouded by their unfulfilled
hopes of having a perfect baby. There will be added expenses,
both to save the baby and to adequately educate and maintain
the health of the child. They also may have less invested in
this new life than traditional parents because their roles were
36. See John L. Hill, What Does it Mean to be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology
as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 397-98 (1991).
37. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 34, at 244.
38. That both can make reasoned judgments and possess adequate information is
not problematic. As for emotional stability, there is no denying this is an emotional
situation. However, I present a group of people experiencing a very emotional trauma
who are nonetheless stable.
2831996]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:275
essentially completed nine months ago. While they monitored
the pregnancy and interacted with Lisa on a regular basis dur-
ing those nine months, this is not necessarily equivalent to the
actual experience of a pregnant woman and her husband. To be
sure, they have a great emotional stake in this child. They are
greatly saddened by this tragic turn of events, and the decision
to forego treatment for their child is undoubtedly the hardest
decision they have ever made. If they cannot give the child as
perfect a life as possible, they feel it is better for the child, for
them, and for society to allow the baby to die.
It is questionable whether this analysis reveals a true conflict
between the parents' interests and the baby's interests. One
way to determine whether a conflict exists is to examine the
impartiality of the decisionmakers:
[For surrogates of neonatal patients,] the requirement of
impartiality means that such persons should determine, as
objectively as possible, whether life-prolonging treatment
would be in the best interests of the individual neonate in
question. . . . [T]he persons making the treat-
mentlnontreatment decision should be disinterested in the
particular case at issue and dispassionate in weighing avail-
able alternatives.39
If impartiality indicates a lack of conflict and partiality is
equated with conflict, there most definitely exists a conflict
between the parents' and the child's interests. However, accept-
ing the fact that parents are generally the best surrogate deci-
sionmakers, one might ask, "When are parents ever 'disinter-
ested?'
"Impartiality" should not require "neutrality." Parents will
always have a vested interest in the decisions they make about
their children, and in spite of this interest, they generally re-
main the best surrogate decisionmakers. However, when the
decision takes into account monetary and other effects on the
39. ROBERT F. WEIR, SELECTIVE NONTREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNs:
MORAL DILEMMAS IN NEONATAL MEDICINE 256 (1984). Weir actually uses impartiality
as one criterion for determining who should make a surrogate decision for an infant.
The other three (relevant knowledge and information, emotional stability, and con-
sistency) are closely aligned with the four used by Beauchamp and Childress. Id. at
255-57.
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parents, it is less likely that the decision is going to be impar-
tial. The less impartial the decision will be, the less appropriate
it is for them to be the decisionmakers.
Lisa contends that she is thinking only of the child. She is
not worrying about the future costs or the problems of having
this child. She believes that because the operation would allow
the baby to live and grow, Down syndrome is not enough to
justify terminating his life. While these are noble thoughts, on
what basis is Lisa claiming the authority to act? If she is as-
serting traditional parental rights by virtue of the fact that she
gave birth to him, she may be in a good position to claim that
she suffers from no conflict. As a "parent," she would be respon-
sible both for the costs and burdens of seeing this child through
life; unlike Joe and Melissa, Lisa may be disregarding these
considerations. If she is willing to take on these responsibilities
after knowing what lies ahead, she should be given the chance
to do so. If, however, she is making this decision without taking
responsibility for the upbringing of the child, why should she be
allowed to decide the course of action and then abandon the
child? It appears clear from our scenario, however, that Lisa is
not ready to bear the burden of raising this child.
The question then becomes, "What is in the child's best inter-
ests?" Is Lisa, as decisionmaker but not as traditional parent,
at odds with the child's best interest? Lisa would say that she
has only the best interests of the child in mind and that Joe
and Melissa are relying too heavily on the effects the child's life
will have on them. She therefore has impartiality on her side.
At least one ethicist would require parents and physicians in
this situation to "distinguish between the question of ultimate
custody of the child and the question of its immediate medical
care and, if possible, let the decisions regarding medical care be
made by a disinterested party."' Lisa seems to be the amal-
gam of decisionmakers that is very rare in neonatal cases: the
disinterested parent. She has the emotional attachment of a
birth parent without the extraneous influences of a custodial
parent. Given these conditions, she appears to be the best
decisionmaker. The task now is to determine if her choice is
the right one.
40. Id. at 150.
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B. The Decision
In making this decision, two other principles of biomedical
ethics are indicated: beneficence and nonmaleficence. In their
simplest terms, the principle of beneficence refers to a "moral
obligation to act for the benefit of others," while the principle of
nonmaleficence is most closely associated with the medical
maxim, "Above all do no harm."4 With a beneficence analysis,
we determine what it is that we must do in order to be moral
people.42 Concurrently, we must be aware that the principal of
nonmaleficence is often violated by prolonging a suffering life
with medical treatment.' In trying to translate these two
principles into general obligations, some philosophers have
derived a list of four directives, listed in ascending order of the
active participation required by the actor:
1) One ought not to inflict evil or harm.
2) One ought to prevent evil or harm.
3) One ought to remove evil or harm.
4) One ought to do or promote good."
The first is an obligation of nonmaleficence, and the others are
obligations of beneficence. While we have obligations of
nonmaleficence to all, and it would be immoral to act malefi-
cently toward any party, we are not required to act beneficently
toward anyone with whom we do not have a special relation-
ship, such as that between a parent and a child.45
When asked, Joe and Melissa would say that their actions
are both beneficent and nonmaleficient. They are merely pre-
venting a procedure from being performed, so rather than ac-
tively killing the child, they would allow the baby to die as a
result of the detached esophagus. Also, if Down syndrome were
the only complication, they would not think of killing the baby.
Since the baby also has a life-threatening defect, they are not
41. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 34, at 189, 260.
42. Id. at 189-90, 291.
43. Id. at 189.
44. Id. at 190 (citing WILLIAM FRANKENA, ETHICS 47 (2d ed. 1973)).
45. Id. at 262-63.
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going to make their child endure the surgical procedure to
prolong a life that Joe and Melissa see as having little value.
Given the kind of life the child would have, in combination
with the other considerations, they feel it would be better to
forego the treatment. They are merely letting happen what
would naturally happen, so they are being nonmaleficent. They
are also acting beneficently by relieving the baby of any present
or future suffering he may experience.
This analysis reveals moral flaws that, while common, may
indicate that another decision should be reached. First, whether
they are withdrawing a procedure or not starting a procedure is
irrelevant. Even physicians attempt to make this distinction
regularly: "[p]hysicians commonly feel more responsible for a
patient's death that results from stopping a respirator than
from not starting one."46 Many times, a physician will request
a "Do Not Resuscitate" order for a patient pursuant to family
wishes, guaranteeing death if the patient goes into cardiac
arrest. Is there any moral reason for treating withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment as morally different and more serious
than withholding the treatment in the first place?47 To borrow
an example, suppose respirators turned themselves off every
twenty four hours and had to be turned on again manually.
Would failure to start these respirators be an omission while
turning off an ordinary respirator an act? No real moral distinc-
tion can be drawn between the two.' It is illogical to base
moral distinctions on the dictates of technology. Given that Joe
and Melissa have interpreted their choice as an allowable fail-
ure to act, their natural reaction may "lead them to act in ways
that are not morally defensible and that conflict with their own
considered moral judgements."49
The term '"illing" has connotations of maleficence, while
"letting die" conjures ideas of nonmaleficence. ° However, even
though "killing" has come to mean "unjustified killing," not
46. See Beauchamp, supra note 31, at 340.
47. Id.
48. Alexander M. Capron, Borrowed Lessons: The Role of Ethical Distinctions in
Framing Law on Life-Sustaining Treatment, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 647, 650 (1984).
49. Beauchamp, supra note 31 at 341.
50. See, e.g., People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 728-29 (Mich. 1994)
(Cavanagh, C.J., dissenting).
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acting to save someone's life remains, strictly speaking, kill-
ing."' One ends another person's life whether it is accom-
plished by unplugging a respirator or providing poison. It would
be more useful to talk in terms of justified killing and unjusti-
fied killing.52 Joe and Melissa's refuge in the idea that they
are merely letting their baby die is false, because refusing med-
ical treatment in this case could be morally unjustified.
Another element of the decision which may be flawed is the
distinction hinging upon the "extraordinary" procedure which is
called for in order to save the baby. In common terms, physi-
cians would not necessarily endorse extraordinary procedures to
save a deformed baby. They would, however, encourage ordi-
nary procedures to be performed.53 In one survey, when asked
whether they considered repair of duodenal atresia an ordinary
or extraordinary operation, one hundred percent of. physician
respondents in a survey said that it was ordinary; however,
many physicians responded that performance of the same proce-
dure on a baby with Down syndrome would be extraordinary.54
Why does an ordinary procedure for one baby become ex-
traordinary for another? For these doctors, the decision to treat
seems related more to opinions about Down syndrome rather
than opinions about the type of treatment involved.55 Also,
what is extraordinary, as well as what is ordinary, can be a
relative idea. For instance, to a physician who deals with respi-
rators every day of his life, a decision to put someone on a res-
pirator might not be truly "extraordinary."56 In both cases, ar-
bitrary and morally inexplicable distinctions have the potential
to serve as the basis for a morally indefensible choice to with-
hold medical treatment. Another illustration of this problem can
be posed by this question: if a seven-year-old child with Down
syndrome was in an accident and required a tracheotomy to
51. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 34, at 221-22.
52. See id.
53. Indeed, courts often allow patients to refuse "extraordinary" procedures. See,
e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981); State v. Ruane, No. OIC01-9311-CR-
00393, 1995 WL 415275 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
54. Norman Fost, Baby Doe: Problems and Solutions, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 637, 640
(1984) (citing Shaw, Randolph & Manard, Ethical Issues in Pediatric Surgery: A Na-
tional Survey of Pediatricians and Pediatric Surgeons, 60 PEDIATRICS 588 (1977)).
55. Id.
56. Capron, supra note 48, at 653.
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allow breathing, would parents be justified in forgoing this
procedure simply because their child had Down syndrome? If
not (and the answer must surely be "no"), why would the par-
ents be justified in not allowing a life saving procedure at the
beginning of the child's life? Since the extraordinary/ordinary
distinction is as unhelpful as the active/passive distinction, the
most beneficial distinction might actually be a third, which
measures the benefits of treatment versus the burdens of treat-
ment.
A discussion of costs and benefits returns us somewhat to the
concept of respect for autonomy and the decisionmaking method
in the case of an incompetent patient. Because we are dealing
with an infant, we have no way of knowing what he would
have wanted. The standard used when we have no way of de-
termining what the patient would have wanted is commonly
referred to as the "best interests" standard.57 This type of cri-
tique involves a cost-benefit analysis which takes into account
the physical suffering currently experienced by the infant, the
suffering that any treatment would create or prolong, the quali-
ty of life that the infant can expect, and other tangible aspects
directly affecting the infant.58 Ideally, this analysis should in-
volve only the effect on the child. However, other factors, such
as financial cost of care and the effect on other family mem-
bers, often come into the analysis. Correctly conceived, the
surrogate decisionmaker should focus only on "the value of the
life for the person who must live it."59
There are some other considerations which should be kept in
mind under this analysis. First, the less likely it is that an act
will help someone, the lower the obligation to act in order to be
beneficent.6" Also, in the case of an infant, "one may wish to
expend major resources in order to bring persons into existence,
only if that existence will be of sufficient quality and quanti-
ty."6 These quality and quantity judgments must be made by
those associated with the infant.
62
57. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 34, at 178.
58. Id. at 180.
59. Id.
60. H. TRIsTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., THE FOUNDATIONS OF BiosmIcs 230 (1986).
61. Id
62. Id.
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In this situation, the most important consideration under the
cost-benefit analysis is that the operation could, and probably
would, save the child's life. However, repair of his esophageal
problem is a "rigorous procedure, generally accompanied by a
significant amount of pain," and additional surgery is often re-
quired over several years.63 Of course, if the child survived, he
would live with Down syndrome for the rest of his life. The
average life span of a person with Down syndrome is some-
where between forty and just over fifty years; however, twenty
to forty percent of all Down syndrome babies die before age
ten.64 There are, of course, countless Down syndrome children
who live long, happy, and productive lives. On the other hand,
there is no way of knowing what other additional physical com-
plications may arise in the future."
If the child is allowed to die, the process by which death
overtakes life will not be pleasant. As all intravenous feeding is
removed, the child's body weight will drop from lack of nourish-
ment, he will cry from hunger, and his lips will become parched
from dehydration.66 Because of the esophageal detachment,
stomach acid will corrode the lungs, and once this occurs, the
baby eventually hemorrhage blood from his nose and mouth."1
Finally, the baby will die, succumbing to chemical pneumonia,
"due to regurgitation of his own stomach acid."6"
Given the outlook under each of the two scenarios, the cost
benefit analysis for this situation is replete with uncertainty.
While we know the death from non-treatment will be painful,
we are unsure whether any future medical condition will be
more painful. While we know the child will not be like other
children, he may lead a very happy life. Both sides can point to
costs and benefits which weigh in their favor. Choices between
life and death, when there are arguably valid arguments on
both sides, should be made in favor of life. Lisa can make a
good argument for providing the lifesaving treatment. The
baby's chances for a healthy life are no worse than his chances
63. LYON, supra note 2, at 26-27.
64. Id. at 26, 209.
65. Id. at 55-56.
66. Id. at 35.
67. Id. at 36-37.
68. Id. at 38. In the case of Baby Doe, the whole ordeal took six days. Id.
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for a poor life. Death will surely be a painful exit. For these
reasons, Lisa's decision to provide treatment should stand.
Once the decision to provide treatment is made, it is a sec-
ondary decision to decide what Joe and Melissa are going to do.
They may not realize it now, but their lives would probably be
enriched beyond their wildest dreams if they choose to keep
their child. In the event that they choose to give up their son
and since Lisa has neither wanted nor been willing to take
custody, one possible option is to offer the baby for adoption. 9
Of course, if no one were to adopt the child, he would become a
ward of the state.' ° Again, in a purely ethical framework,
these are all extraneous factors which, while important, do not
have much significance in determining whether non-treatment
is beneficent and nonmaleficent. Given the close call on the
costs and benefits and the fact that the parties involved cannot
know with any degree of certainty what the future holds, the
best decision would be to treat the esophageal abnormality as
effectively as possible.
III. THE LEGAL ANSWER
For the legal analysis, it will be helpful to ask the same
questions that we asked for the ethical analysis. Determining
who the parents are may shed light on which decision would be
upheld in a court of law.
A. Who Is the Real Mother?
Who the legal parents are will depend primarily on how the
court interprets the arrangement between the parties. This will
entail an analysis of the legal status of the surrogacy contract.
Many states now have statutes which provide guidelines to
determine the validity of such contracts.' The groundbreaking
69. Indeed, there was at least one outside couple willing to take and even fight
for custody of Baby Doe. Id. at 35.
70. Id. at 285. This would not be a solution without its costs to society; "If a
Downs child is institutionalized starting today, the bill to the taxpayer will be $1.5
million over the course of his or her lifetime." Id.
71. Statutes which prohibit surrogacy contracts include: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
25-218 (1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-8-2-1 (West Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
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case judicially interpreting the validity of surrogacy contracts
came in New Jersey in 1988. In In re Baby M., the Supreme
Court of New Jersey was confronted with a man (Mr. Stem)
whose wife had a mild case of multiple sclerosis and did not
want to go through the possible complications of pregnancy.72
Mr. Stern made an agreement with another woman (Ms. White-
head) to have his baby.73 The method of conception was artifi-
cial insemination, whereby Ms. Whitehead was impregnated
with Mr. Stem's sperm.74 Unlike Joe and Melissa's case, this
surrogate mother was both the birth mother and the biological
mother, a key distinction.
When Ms. Whitehead refused to give up the child shortly
after birth, the Sterns sued.7" The court had to decide who the
legal parents were. In a careful decision, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court found the contract invalid." Not only did the con-
tract conflict with statutory provisions "prohibiting the use of
money in connection with adoptions . . . laws requiring proof of
parental unfitness or abandonment before termination of paren-
tal rights ... and.., laws that make surrender of custody
and consent to adoption reversible in private placement adop-
tions,"7 the contract also, by determining in advance of birth
which natural parent is to have custody, conflicted with the
public policy of the state that the child's best interests shall
determine the custody of the child.7" In the end, Ms. White-
head and Mr. Stern were found to be the parents, despite the
contract under which Ms. Whitehead promised to give up all
parental rights.79
199.590(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West
1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (1991); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.240 (Supp. 1994) (void
if for compensation). Statutes which expressly allow surrogacy contracts are: ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212 (West Supp. 1994)
(surrogate has right not to surrender rights of child and no compensation other than
reasonable expenses, may be paid). A statute which indirectly allows surrogacy con-
tracts is: NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.287 (1991).
72. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
73. Id. at 1235.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1237.
76. Id. at 1240.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1246.
79. Id. at 1246-50.
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While this case presents a popular view rejecting the validity
of surrogate contracts in general, it did not involve a situation
in which the birth mother and the biological mother are two
different people. California, however, was recently confronted
with just such a situation. In Johnson v. Calvert, Mr. and Mrs.
Calvert entered into a surrogacy contract with Ms. Johnson,
whereby Ms. Johnson was implanted with an egg from Mrs.
Calvert, fertilized by Mr. Calvert." Ms. Johnson agreed to give
up the baby and all parental rights at birth.81 Unfortunately,
the relationship between the couple and the surrogate soured,
and both the Calverts and Ms. Johnson sued for custody.
82
In deciding who the "real" mother was, the court noted that
there was undisputed evidence showing that Mrs. Calvert was
genetically related to the child and that Ms. Johnson gave birth
to the child.83 While both women thus provided evidence of a
mother-child relationship as contemplated by the California
Uniform Parentage Act, the law could only recognize one natu-
ral mother." Because of this dilemma, the court resorted to an
analysis of the intent of the parties and concluded that, under
California law, when genetic parentage and birth parentage do
not coincide in one person, "she who intended to bring about
the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own...
is the natural mother."85 By validating the intent of the surro-
gacy contract, the court did not find the agreement to be incon-
sistent with public policy.8"
In a strong dissent, one justice argued that the "best inter-
ests" standard should be used rather than the "intent" test.8
"This 'best interests' standard serves to assure that in the judi-
cial resolution of disputes affecting a child's well-being, protec-
tion of the minor child is the foremost consideration." 8  The
80. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
81. Id. at 778. Mrs. Calvert had previously undergone a hysterectomy, thereby
rendering her unable to carry a child. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 781.
84. Id. Amicus briefs submitted by the American Civil Liberties Union encouraged
the court to find that the child had two mothers. The court declined to do so. Id.
85. Id. at 782.
86. Id. at 783.
87. Id. at 789 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 799 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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factors which should be considered under this analysis are the
abilities to nurture the child physically and psychologically, to
provide ethical and intellectual guidance, and to provide stabili-
ty and continuity. 9 The intent of the genetic mother is rele-
vant in this analysis, but not dispositive
While the dissenting opinion in Johnson is persuasive, the
law of California would call Joe and Melissa the parents and
would give them full decisionmaking authority. Two other
states have examined California's reasoning. New York found it
persuasive,9 while Ohio did not.92 In jurisdictions which have
not addressed this question, especially those jurisdictions which
have invalidated surrogacy contracts, it would be difficult to
guess how courts would interpret the rights of a woman who
gave birth to a baby who was not her genetic child. Under the
rational of the Baby M. decision, Lisa would have a good argu-
ment that the contract is void and that she should be allowed
to exercise her rights as a parent. She was the one who gave
birth to the child, and Melissa should be treated as nothing
more than an egg donor. As such, Lisa should be able to help
make the decision. If Lisa and Joe are to be treated as the
baby's parents, the issue then becomes how the court should
resolve the conflict between the two parents. The court would
probably have to act as final arbiter and look to the best inter-
ests of the child, as it must in any event when looking to see
which decision is correct.93 It is important to point out that
Lisa would also be required to live up to the responsibilities of
a parent if she were claiming her parental rights. A court
would probably not allow her to make an important decision
regarding treatment for the baby if she were not willing to help
with the parenting.
Given that Joe and Melissa would be found to be the parents
in at least two of the three jurisdictions which have answered
this question, we now turn to the type of decision they may be
able to make.
89. Id. at 800 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
90. Id.
91. See McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
92. Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994).
93. See infra part III.B.1.
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B. The Decision to Terminate Life
1. State Court Interpretations
Courts have continually affirmed the idea that an autono-
mous person has the right to refuse medical treatment. 4 In
addition, "[v]irtually every state court has extended the right to
refuse medical treatment to include nonautonomous patients."5
A number of courts have specifically looked at this issue and
have used a number of different standards to determine what
decision is warranted.
In Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz,9 6 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was
faced with the issue of whether to allow a severely retarded
sixty-seven year old man with a mental age of two to forego
painful chemotherapy treatment for a fatal case of leukemia.97
Mr. Saikewicz had a court-appointed guardian as his
surrogate" advocating that he be spared the chemotherapy
treatment which would have made him feel sicker and might
not have affected the cancer. 9 Treatment was rejected in favor
of the relatively painless and natural death that would have
resulted in a few weeks or months if no course of treatment
were pursued.' ° The trial court found six factors about Mr.
Saikewicz's situation which supported the decision to forego
treatment, and only two factors which supported forcing the
chemotherapy.101 Consequently, he was not forced to receive
the treatment.
94. Robert F. Weir & Larry Gostin, Decisions to Abate Life-Sustaining Treatment
for Nonautonomous Patients, 264 JAMA 1846, 1848 (1990). The U.S. Supreme Court,
while endorsing the right of autonomous people to refuse medical treatment, has said
that individual states may require a high standard of evidence that an incompetent
patient had expressed wishes prior to incompetence that he not be allowed to live if
he were forced to use a feeding tube. Id. at 1847.
95. Id. at 1848.
96. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
97. Id. at 420.
98. The only member of his family who could be located were two sisters who
wanted nothing to do with the situation. Id.
99. Id. at 421.
100. Id. at 420-21.
101. Id. at 422.
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In reviewing the trial court's decision, the supreme judicial
court noted:
[T]he substantive rights of the competent and the incompe-
tent person are the same in regard to the right to decline
potentially life-prolonging treatment. The factors which
distinguish the two types of persons are found only in the
area of how the State should approach the preservation and
implementation of an incompetent person's wishes and in
the procedures necessary to that process of preservation and
implementation.12
After recognizing the longstanding right of privacy that guaran-
tees each person freedom from bodily invasion,0 3 the court
proceeded to weigh the interests the state has in keeping peo-
ple alive. The court identified four compelling state interests: 1)
the preservation of life; 2) the protection of the interests of
innocent third parties; 3) the prevention of suicide; and 4)
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession.'
14
The court then balanced the "interest of the State in prolonging
a life . . . with the interest of an individual to reject the trau-
matic cost of that prolongation." °5 The court could not say
that the lower court's balancing was incorrect, so they extended
the analysis to determine what legal standard should be used
in determining whether to administer life-prolonging treatment
to an incompetent.0 6 The court found that Mr. Saikewicz's
guardian had satisfied the requirements of the best interests
standard and, in a sort of hybrid of the best interests and sub-
stituted judgment tests, determined that the guardian was
fighting for the same outcome that the incompetent would have
fought for if he could.'
102. Id. at 423.
103. The Massachusetts court extrapolated from the "unwritten Constitutional right
of privacy found in the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights" the
right of a patient to be free from unwanted bodily invasions. Id. at 424. However, the
United States Supreme Court later rejected extending this "penumbra" of rights to
the right to refuse life-prolonging forced feeding, and instead found the right in the
concept of liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't
of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
104. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 427.
107. Id. at 427-31.
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In a similar case, the New Jersey Supreme Court used two
different best interests tests. In In re Conroy, an incompetent
eighty-four-year-old woman with a litany of ailments was being
kept alive by a nasogastric feeding tube.' Her only blood rel-
ative was a nephew acting as her guardian, and he was asking
that she be allowed to die."° The New Jersey court declared
that life-sustaining treatment may be withheld when it is clear
that the patient would have refused the treatment under the
particular circumstances." 0 To determine what an incompe-
tent person would have wanted, the court decided to use either
a "limited objective" best interests test or a "pure objective" best
interests test."' The limited objective test requires some
trustworthy evidence that the patient would have refused
treatment," which renders this test useless in the case of the
never-competent, since there will never be evidence of how that
patient would have acted. Under the pure objective test, the
"net burdens of the patient's life with the treatment should
clearly and markedly outweigh the benefits that the patient
derives from life" in order for life-sustaining treatment to be
withheld."' In spite of this balancing, the court expressly re-
jected the use of such factors as assessments of personal worth
or social utility of a patient's life or of the value of the patient's
life to others." Given the inherent uncertainty of such a test,
the court said it could not justify terminating life-sustaining
treatment if the evidence was insufficient to satisfy either stan-
dard; furthermore, whenever "evidence of a person's wishes or
physical or mental condition is equivocal, it is best to err, if at
all, in favor of preserving life.""5
These two cases provide a helpful framework for analysis.
Parental decisions, especially those relating to young children,
have generally been allowed to stand. Even though the doctrine
of parens patriae allows the state to come in and protect the
interest of any of its citizens, "its invocation has been tempered
108. 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
109. Id. at 1215-17.
110. Id. at 1229.
111. Id. at 1231-32.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1232.
114. Id. at 1233.
115. Id.
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by the long standing preference for decentralized decisionmak-
ing in matters concerning the family.""6 This is supported by
the idea that it is the parent who is in the best position to
make decisions that are in the best interest of the child.'
While there are instances when the state will intervene to pro-
tect children,"8 "the number of these instances are small be-
cause a policy of minimal interference serves the state's own
interests. The nurtured family is a source of productive cit-
izens.""' In these situations, the parental interests override
the four state interests pointed out by the court in Saikewicz.
Nevertheless, Conroy suggests that some courts are unwilling to
gamble when there is no clear evidence that terminating the
patient's life is in the patient's best interest. In balancing these
interests, when the incompetent is a child and the parents are
the ones making the choice, the proof required in Conroy may
be relaxed in order to respect the rights of the parents.
In the end, Joe and Melissa would probably be allowed to
make the decision. Further, since their decision to allow their
child to die is supported by some evidence that it is in the
child's best interest and is the result of careful deliberation, it
would likely be approved by a court.
2. Other Possible Responses
a. Child Abuse Legislation
In Virginia, as with all other states, it is a crime to abuse or
neglect a child. Under the Virginia statute, "Any parent...
who by willful act or omission or refusal to provide any neces-
sary care for the child's health causes or permits serious injury
to the life or health of such child shall be guilty of a Class 4
felony."' In order to prosecute a parent for killing a newborn
baby, it must be proven that 1) the child was born alive, 2) the
child had reached an independent and separate existence apart
116. Haddon, supra note 32, at 567-68.
117. Id.
118. For instance, the state will intervene to protect children in areas of education,
vaccination, inoculation, and abortion decisions.
119. Haddon, supra note 32, at 567-68.
120. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.1 (Michie Supp. 1995).
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from its mother, and 3) the accused was the criminal agent
causing the infant's death.'2 It is this third element which
would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove in a situation such
as ours. Given the broad autonomy granted to parents in medi-
cal treatment decisions, it is difficult to imagine that Joe and
Melissa would be convicted of child abuse.
Federal statutory protection is another possibility. After the
1982 Baby Doe case in Bloomington, Indiana,12 Congress
passed the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984.2 Congress at-
tempted to protect disabled infants from medical neglect, de-
fined as "instances of withholding of medically indicated treat-
ment from disabled infants with life threatening conditions.""
The amendments make an exception to the mandate for medi-
cal treatment. Under the statute:
[Withholding medically indicated treatment] does not in-
clude the failure to provide treatment (other than appropri-
ate nutrition, hydration, or medication) to an infant when,
in the treating physician's... reasonable medical judge-
ment-
(A) the infant is chronically and irreversibly
comatose;
(B) the provision of such treatment would-
(i) merely prolong dying,
(ii) not be effective in ameliorating or
correcting all of the infant's life-threat-
ening conditions, or
(iii) otherwise be futile in terms of
the survival of the infant; or
(C) the provision of such treatment would be
virtually futile in terms of the survival of the
infant and the treatment itself under such cir-
cumstances would be inhumane.
While this may appear to allow for termination of neonates'
121. Lane v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 509, 514 (1978).
122. See supra note 2.
123. Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-
5106 (1988)).
124. Mary A. Crossley, Of Diagnosis and Discrimination: Discriminatory Non-Treat-
ment of Infants with HIV Infection, 93 COLuM. L. REV. 1581, 1612 (1993) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(10) (1988)).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(10) (1988).
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medical treatment, a close reading of the statute indicates a
number of scenarios in which continued treatment would be
required. Inhumanity of treatment alone is not enough to allow
a baby to die, since exception (C) also requires that the treat-
ment be futile."6 In addition, the statute calls for "reasonable
medical judgement," but does not indicate that ethical consider-
ations or even parents' wishes should be considered."' Indeed,
in theory, "[tihe extent to which treatment is made compulsory
by the federal rule is astonishing.""
However, this harshness exists solely in theory. The require-
ments are only binding on the states if they accept money from
a "minor federal grant program" that provides limited funds for
state child abuse and neglect agencies." In addition, enforce-
ment of these provisions is relegated to state child protective
service agencies.13 ° The amendments "have faced no judicial
challenges and have generated little litigation."'31 The lack of
cases likely has much to do with the scarcity of resources in
state agencies in spite of federal support, and a reluctance to
rechannel funds "away from growing problems of physical and
sexual abuse and drug-exposed infants to Baby Doe enforce-
ment activity.""2
The attempts of the federal government to address this prob-
lem through legislation demonstrate the difficulty of statutorily
mandating what is largely an ethical and moral decision. No
bright lines can be drawn between those cases like ours in
which different outcomes can be supported as ethical and those
cases which involve true abuse, neglect, and criminal negli-
gence. Perhaps this is one issue which does not warrant govern-
ment involvement.
126. See Stephen A. Newman, Baby Doe, Congress and the States: Challenging the
Federal Treatment Standard for Impaired Infants, 15 AM. J. L. & MED. 1, 4 (1989).
127. Id. at 4-5.
128. Id. at 4.
129. Id. at 2.
130. Crossley, supra note 124, at 1614-15.
131. Id. at 1615.
132. Id. at 1616.
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b. The Americans with Disabilities Act
In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).'33 The purpose of the ADA is to recognize and correct
the way that "society has tended to isolate and segregate indi-
viduals with disabilities."" The ADA also specifically recog-
nizes that this discrimination has historically extended to the
area of health services.
3 5
The ADA generally prohibits discrimination on the basis of
handicap. Perhaps the ADA could be used to strike at those
decisions which mandate that a Down syndrome baby not re-
ceive an operation to correct a defect that an otherwise healthy
baby in the next bed would receive. While this has not yet been
tested in a situation similar to that of Joe and Melissa, it
would seem that "in most cases an infant's parents make deci-
sions regarding their baby's medical treatment, and... the
ADA [does not] extend to such quintessential private, parental
decisionmaking." 6
IV. WHICH IS RIGHT?
Both parties make persuasive cases. Under the ethical frame-
work, Lisa is a valid surrogate decisionmaker. Her decision to
treat the esophageal atresia and allow the baby to live is both
beneficent and nonmaleficent. Legally, however, Joe and Melis-
sa would likely have the upper hand. As the biological parents
who intend to care for the child, they would be the best deci-
sionmakers. Because Joe and Melissa could effectively argue
that the child's best interests were being provided for, their
decision to withhold treatment would stand in a court of law.
Though it is an extremely close case, the ethical analysis
provides the better answer. Many unknowable variables must
be evaluated and quantified. The baby could live a wonderful
133. Pub. L. 101-336. 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101-
12213 (Supp. V 1993)).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
135. Id. § 12101(a)(3).
136. Crossley, supra note 124, at 1643.
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life, or he could live a horrible life. He could have other compli-
cations in childhood, adolescence, or adulthood or he could live
a long healthy life. The procedure to correct the esophagal
blockage may cause more suffering. Doing nothing would cer-
tainly bring about a painful end. To take language from the
New Jersey Supreme Court, when evidence of the likely effects
of medical treatment on a person's life is uncertain, "it is best
to err, if at all, in favor of preserving life."'
Of course, the ethical solution is not perfect. While it is easy
in a theoretical exercise to say that financial and other consid-
erations must not enter into the decisionmaking process, the
reality is that extravagant costs of caring for sick children can
have "ruinous effects on families, depriving parents and existing
children of their economic security."'38 While there is no tell-
ing what the added costs will be in the future, it is clear that
the chance for survival is good, and as that chance increases,
the consideration of cost as a factor should decrease. 9 In ad-
dition, one may be tempted to require Lisa to share some of the
responsibilities if her wishes are allowed to control. The mecha-
nism with which this would be accomplished is hard to imag-
ine. One possibility is for a court to require her as a "birth
parent" to share at least partially in the added costs of raising
this child.
In a sense, neither decision is "right." One decision is an
ethical decision and one is a legal decision. Each has been de-
veloped using two separate systems of values and priorities.
Perhaps the "right" decision will be the one produced when the
two systems working in harmony, with the strengths of one
system complementing the weaknesses of the other. Maybe
Solomon would have a better answer. For the sake of the Baby
Does of this country, the "right" decision cannot come soon
enough.
Adam Marshall
137. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1233 (N.J. 1985).
138. Newman, supra note 126, at 52.
139. Id.
302
